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This study examined the problem of premature discharges
of non-prior service male enlisted service members due to
their failure to meet minimum behavioral or performance
criteria. Based on records of all first-term male enlisted
Marines discharged in FY '75 or '76, probabilities of
successfully completing enlistment (avoidance of adverse
discharge) are calculated for various subgroups of Marines
based on demographic factors. The findings of previous
studies are generally supported. In addition, geographic
location of home of record in connection with education
level was found to have a significant bearing on success
rates. Possible uses of this information are pointed out
in connection with establishment of accession policies
and allocation of recruiting assets.
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Personnel attrition, the separation of enlisted members
prior to their expiration of active service (EAS) , has come
to be recognized as a serious drain on the Marine Corps'
most precious asset, its manpower. Of those Marines who
enlisted in the Marine Corps during Fiscal Year 1971, 25.l7o
were discharged early, either the result of disciplinary
action or administratively for failure to meet minimum be-
havior and performance criteria. Furthermore, Reference 1
indicates that this trend is continuing and that the Marine
Corps is not unique in facing this problem. All four ser-
vices are suffering similar rates of non-EAS attrition.
While it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the
elimination of the draft in 1972 was a cause of increased
ittrition rates, there is little doubt that it has affected
:he seriousness with which the problem is viewed by Depart-
lent of Defense manpower officials. The cost of personnel
"ailures within the service has risen dramatically as a
esult of increases in funds needed for recruitment and
ncreased military pay and training costs.
No up-to-date estimates of these costs were available
rom the Marine Corps at the time of this writing. However,
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some cost estimates of this problem in the Navy have been
developed and are presented here to give the reader a general
idea of the importance of the problem. It is not unreason-
able to assume that costs to the Marine Corps caused by non-
EAS attrition are of the same general magnitude. Reference 2
estimates the dollar costs of recruiting and training a
replacement for a service failure to be $2350 for a man who
receives no formal schooling beyond recruit training and from
$7112 to $10,112 for a man who receives additional schooling
or apprentice training. It should be understood that these
costs do not include those that would accrue from empty
training seats and fleet billets, not to mention disruptive
effects on morale and disciplinary, administrative, and
supervisory costs of handling substandard performers.
Stephan, et.al. in Reference 3, a 1972 study based on
1967-1970 attrition rates (which averaged 14.3% of acces-
sions)
,
determined that the Navy, in order to maintain a
force of 300,000 effective individuals in the second through
fourth years of service, would annually have to recruit,
train, and pay, for various lengths of service, an additional
12,612 men above steady-state requirements. The cost of this
higher force level, necessary to provide for attrition, was
estimated to be $86 million above that of a force level with
no attrition. Assuming a Marine Corps attrition rate of

257o and an accession rate of 50,000 annually and allowing
for inflation of military pay at an assumed rate of 5%
annually, the increased cost of maintaining the necessary
force level traceable to personnel attrition in the Marine
Corps is presently something in the neighborhood of $73
million per year. This estimate is still conservative
because it assumes that an individual is as productive as
his peers until the day he is discharged.
The precision of the above estimate is not of concern
here. The general magnitude however provides considerable
incentive to be interested in the problem of personnel
attrition and to seek to find ways to cut the attrition
rate, or at least to decrease the cost of attrition. Some
general approaches to this end which will be addressed in
this study are to improve screening at recruiting centers
and recruit training depots and to cut the costs of re-




Most of the literature that pertains to the personnel-
attrition problem in the Armed Forces consists of empirical
studies that analyze data from actual service attritions
as to the demographic characteristics of the individual
failures and generalize from these attrition samples, deter-
mining probabilities of success or failure for men with like
characteristics. The following review is presented to indi-
cate the nature and scope of research that has been conducted
on this subject.
The point of departure for most modern thought on the
subject is Reference 4, a 1968 study by Plag, based on data
from men who entered the Navy in 1960. This study examined
attrition rates in relation to education, mental ability,
and other factors and confirmed earlier findings that there
is a large disparity between the attrition of high school
graduates and non-graduates. From this study came a table
of "Odds for Effectiveness" which was used by Navy recruit-
ers until quite recently to help judge the relative desir-
ability of potential recruits based on their characteristics
and the associated probability of their completing the terms
of enlistment. Reference 5 is a 1970 study by Plag that
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again studied the problem of personnel attrition. In this
instance, his sample consisted of 3156 "new mental standards
enlistees" in the Marine Corps. These individuals, who
would previously have been denied enlistment into the Marine
Corps on the basis of low Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT) scores, were admitted under the provisions of
"Project 100,000," a DOD-wide program designed to offer
opportunities to disadvantaged young men. The study analyzed
the success of these men in completing their service in an
effective manner by studying pre-enlistment and recruit-
training variables. The results indicated the following
variables to have some predictive validity: years of educa-
tion, GCT scores, parents' marital status, age at enlistment,
race, and aptitude test scores. From this information "Odds
for Effectiveness" tables were again prepared for recruiter
use. However, improving the success rate of these "new
mental standards" enlistees from an overall rate of 607o to
a rate of 10% solely by using this table would have required
rejection of about 48% of them.
It must be remembered that the above studies were con-
ducted using data taken from periods in which a substantial
number of enlistments in the Navy and Marine Corps were
draft -induced. Concurrent with the move to an all volunteer
force were an increase in the costs associated with attrition
12

and an Increase In f he attr ' emaelvei. Ltl
1972, Stephan, at. ft1 Jtftf. J7 studied Navy rce
peraonnel at trit Ions over i L96S-1971 tiflM IvtuM ftnd I
eluded that loss rates due CO discipline/ - •> -
cins depend much BKMTi ichoc .OH
than Ofl :.<-. a] group* I 18 esse ./ ' .
Hag's findings, ( des C rfttftf L
Stephan, et. ftl, to COflcl Ida thai ft complete revisl
the "Odds for Effectiveneftft" Vftft •" The need 1
improved ftfttliticftl record-keeping 01 ocess
discharges was also pointed out.
In 1973 Carpenter and '.hristal exam: .n Re.
the entire enlisted male input In the /• orce from L95fl
to L969 considering only undesirable types of disch';
They found that .oss rates varied '^P,
school graduation, and ege« Consistent./ 11
mental cfttegi ;h school : .ibited much
lower loss rates fcr mdealreble causes.
Reference 7, by Boyd, et# al, ea that I
similar patten oxlated In connection with deaertlona aaoi
Army accessions who enlisted ti Lscal Years L968 and 969
«
In part:., ax [ >rdi •- .'aapor* -• -•
relative tc oon~deaertera , less well---- • - at
enllataent, lower In AFQT score, oh - om

the South or Mid-Atlantic region, of a minority race, and
in a less skilled military occupational specialty (MOS)
.
One of the main impacts of the above studies was an
improvement in record-keeping in all the services in order
to facilitate improvements in future study efforts. While
no studies of the attrition problem were reported in 1974,
it is apparent that the impact of personnel attrition was
being felt. For in 1975, some very useful studies were
published.
Reference 8 by Haber is directly related to the Marine
Corps personnel-attrition problem. It used as the data
base all individuals who entered the Marine Corps during
1968. This file contains a statistical record with signifi-
cant historical information for all first-term enlistees
from initiation into active duty until separation from ser-
vice or reenlistment . Haber attempted to quantify the
impact of several variables as they affected early attrition
of first-term enlistees. Using contingency table analysis
he examined age at enlistment, race, county population of
the enlistee's home of record, education, length of enlist-
ment, mental group (as indicated by score on the General
Classification Test), MOS, and region of home of record.
The principal findings were that high school graduation is
the most important variable in indicating successful
14

completion of enlistment. Holding all other variables
constant, the retention rate of high school graduates was
about 307o higher than that of non-graduates.
Since this cohort file permitted convenient analysis
of the times until discharge, the discovery of other inter-
esting results was possible. Haber thus found that, other
things equal, two-year enlistees were more likely to com-
plete two years of service than were four-year enlistees,
particularly for non-high school graduates.
The only variables examined in this study which were
found to have no influence on attrition were county popu-
lation and geographic region. However, the level of
aggregation was high in geographic region as only North,
East, South, and West were compared. There was likely as
much variation within these regions as among them. The
county population variable should not have been expected
to be meaningful in any case because it explicitly included
no indication of county size. Perhaps population density
would have been more revealing.
Haber' s conclusion included the inference that while it
may appear to be comparatively inexpensive to acquire high
school non-graduates there may be significant hidden costs
associated with such a policy. He suggests that the derog-
atory effects on unit discipline and morale, resulting from
15

negligible or negative contributions of significant
lmbers of enlistees dropping by the wayside, may be quite
-OUS .
Having identified some factors related in a negative
;e to success of enlistees in the Marine Corps, Haber
ae the important next step of examining in Reference 9
these factors might be related to a positive indication
f success. This study used the same data base and factors
I
previously /Ref . &J to determine what relationships
<st between demographic variables and "trainability" in
Marine Corps, as indicated by earlier-than-average
notions. His principal finding was that, for enlistees
complete their enlistment, high school graduation is
etter prediction of job performance and productivity
n mental-test score. In fact, high school graduates
lower mental groups exhibited a higher level of perform-
e as indicated by promotions than did non-graduates in
ler mental groups. This finding, in conjunction with
finding that graduates are more likely to complete
ir enlistment, allows the more general conclusion that,
1 separately, high school graduation is a more important
Istick of the potential effectiveness of a prospective
Lstee than are scores on tests of mental ability.
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Reference 10 is an examination by Goods tadt and Glickman
of the problem of enlisted attrition in the Navy and Marine
Corps from a slightly different point of view. They pro-
vided some cursory analysis of the magnitude of the problem
and its recent trends. Of interest here was the finding
that the largest proportion of non-EAS (Expiration of Active
Service) attrition occurs during the first two years of
service, the bulk of which is attributed to unsuitable be-
havior. Another finding was that patterns of increasing
job mobility are also present in the civilian sector of
this age bracket in our society, but here direct compari-
sons are dangerous because no contractual employment exists
in that sector. Of more general interest was the observa-
tion that examination of manpower data, like the studies
just discussed, will not reveal the causes of attrition if
they are organizational climate factors or policy variables
within the services. In other words, such studies can only
result in conclusions that will relate to screening of per-
sonnel, whereas more efficient solutions to the attrition
problem may lie in internal management and leadership
actions.
The capstone of the currently available literature on
enlisted-personnel attrition is Reference 11, a 1976 study
by Lockman, Jehn, and Shughart , which develops models for
17

both enlisted attrition and recruiting-district performance.
The data base was a cohort file of all 1973 US Navy non-
prior-service recruits. The variables of education, mental
group, age, race, and whether or not the individual was
responsible for any dependents were broken down into a
total of fifteen categories for which dummy variables were
defined, resulting in 180 possible groups of observations,
148 of which actually contained individuals. Loss rates
were then estimated for each group. The result was predic-
tion of survival rates for the first year of service with
a standard error of only two percentage points. In general
terms, the results provided further confirmation of previous
notions that high school graduation is far more important
in predicting survival of the first year of service than
is mental test score. However, the currency (the accession
data base was not significantly affected by draft pressure)
and improved comprehensiveness and apparent accuracy of
this model made it a substantial improvement over the "Odds
for Effectiveness" model previously in use.
In Reference 12, a further study by Lockman, the accuracy
of the Lockman model was checked against first-year attri-
tion rates of CY 1974 Navy accessions. The result was a high
correlation (r =.95) between predicted and actual loss rates.
The difference noted was that race and dependency were not
18

statistically significant predictors of attrition for the
1974 accessions. The 1973 accession cohort was also examined
to determine loss rates at the end of the second year of
service. Here the same general patterns emerged as in the
first-year, except that after 2 years, the race variable
again dropped out. The conclusion here was that there is
no significant difference in the attrition rates of minority
and majority sailors.
Table I is included to show relative loss /survival
rates for Navy enlisted personnel after two years of service,
as determined by Lockman /Ref. 127.
Table I
PREDICTED TWO-YEAR SUCCESS CHANCES
BY QUALITY CATEGORY (NAVY)
High School School Eligibility Success Chances





The most striking thing about these results is the fact that,
on the average, high school graduates from lower mental
groups are more successful than non-graduates with high
test scores (70.7 vs. 62.3).
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Recognizing this finding, Lockman in Reference 13 went
a step further to determine success rates for non-graduates
who had attained a Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED) cer-
tificate. This was deemed desirable because if holders of
GED certificates were to exhibit success rates close to
those of high school graduates, then the recruiting base
for individuals with high success rates could be expanded
somewhat. Although difficulties were encountered because
of apparent errors in the data base, Lockman was able to
conclude that from the CY 1973 cohort the average GED first-
year success rates fall midway between those of men with
high school diplomas and those who had no degree. There
was little dispersion from this average across age groups
and mental groups, except for mental group IV which showed
lower success rates. These results are not considered en-
tirely conclusive because of the noted errors in the data
and because no allowance was made for differences in GED
requirements, which actually are not uniform but vary widely
from state to state.
Before departing from a discussion of this literature
it is necessary to place the results of References 11, 12,
and 13 in perspective. Reference 14 points out that such
results may be misleading if they are used to predict the
success rates of individuals; for the models were developed
20

by grouping individuals by their characteristics and com-
puting the mean probability of success for each group.
While such models achieve high correlation coefficients
and small standard errors, it is important to understand
that such statistics refer to the means for the groupings
rather than for individuals. There were of course, numer-
ous individual servicemen who performed in an entirely
successful manner, but who would have been given poor
chances (probability) of success based on the factors
considered. Nonetheless, such probabilities can be very
useful in establishing policy.
21

III. RATIONALE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The foregoing has indicated some of the reasons for
studying the problems of personnel attrition in the Marine
Corps. At this point it seems useful to discuss these
issues in connection with their management implications
and theoretical origins in order to channel this research
and provide a basis for a better understanding of the
findings
.
A. AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM
It is essential that leaders and manpower officials of
the Marine Corps have an appreciation for the extent, if
not the underlying causes, of this problem of premature
separation from the service. Broadly, this can be inter-
preted as meaning simply that a leader must know his organi'
zation. If something as significant as this phenomenon
in terms of men and costs exists, then leaders must be
aware of it whatever the causes. While the search for
remedies will be addressed below, some basic knowledge and
understanding of any problem is preliminary to any solution
to that problem.
Planners unaware of this attrition phenomenon could
never make satisfactory estimates and plans for future
22

manpower levels. Accurate budgeting is seriously degraded
if impacts of personnel attrition are not considered in
relation to pay and allowances and recruiting expenses.
Training officials must include some factor for attrition
in determining school quotas. Policy makers must under-
stand the working-level effects that attrition has on their
policies and the effects that efforts to deal with or con-
trol attrition have on operating-level organizations.
Probably most important, leaders, particularly at the
higher levels, must be aware of the effects that high rates
of personnel attrition have on the readiness of their forces
B. THE SEARCH FOR REMEDIES
Awareness of the personnel attrition problem leads
logically to a search for solutions. Is this attrition
controllable? To the extent that non-EAS attrition includes
such things as death and medical discharge there is probably
little that can be done to cut attrition. To the extent
that it includes such things as transfer to officer pro-
grams, it is certainly undesirable to limit attrition. How-
ever the majority of non-EAS attrition today is of a differ-
ent ilk. Such things as disciplinary discharges, administra-
tive discharges due to unfitness or unsuitability , and
discharges relating to recruiting errors are predominant in
23

today's high rates of attrition, and they may be subject
to some form of remedy.
1. Internal Environment and Policy
Goods tadt and Glickman /Ref . 1Q7 have suggested
that many of the reasons for personnel attrition derive
from societal factors encountered in the serviceman's en-
vironment. This implies that many of these service failures
are the result of discretionary behavior on the part of the
individual, a definite possibility in most administrative
discharges. This conclusion is consistent with the results
summarized in Reference 15, which concluded that lack of
job satisfaction was strongly related to worker turnover
and absenteeism in the civilian sector. It is logical that
premature separation from service is the military equivalent
of civilian worker turnover, and further credence is given
to this comparison of the problems of military and civilian
sectors by the currently high rates of absenteeism in the
Marine Corps. The search for solutions to this aspect of the
attrition problem is continuous. It is the conscious effort
of Marine Corps leaders at all echelons. Leadership remedies
to Marine Corps personnel attrition problems are not addressed




Before departing from the subject of reducing attri-
tion through internal policy, we should note that, just as
attrition may be discretionary on the part of the individuals
concerned, it is also discretionary to some extent on the
part of Marine Corps leaders and managers. Various policy
alternatives exist that will result in changing attrition
rates. Discouraging the submission of administrative dis-
charges through moral persuasion of administrators or
tedious administrative requirements will reduce attrition
rates as will explicit limitations on the numbers of such
discharges that may be approved. Such policies, however,
are certain to have serious impact on the quality of the
manpower force. Closing the outlet valve is likely to do
little more than trade one highly visible problem, a high
attrition rate, for another problem. The problem of reduced
quality and discipline in the ranks, while less apparent in
terms of end strengths and attrition rates, is likely to
be the more serious in terms of combat readiness. Thus a
simple solution to a complex problem may not be a solution
at all.
2. Screening and Recruitment Implications
Several of the studies already discussed had an
odds-for-effectiveness or probability-of-success orientation.
They were designed for use by recruiters as a tool for
25

screening of enlisted applicants. The extent of screening
that can be conducted by recruiters is dependent on the re-
cruiter's production quota and the supply of applicants.
If the supply is great relative to the quota, obviously
the recruiters could accept only those with the greatest
predicted chances of completing their enlistment, the high
school graduates from higher mental groups. Normally the
situation is very different, and the use of the tables is
probably limited to a few cases each month when the recruiter
decides which of a relatively few men to accept to meet the
quota. Alternatively, such odds for effectiveness can be
used by policy makers in establishing quotas. For instance
some of the services have recently mandated increases in the
percentage of high school graduates among enlisted accessions.
Such requirements are based, at least implicitly, on the
odds and probabilities developed and refined in the last
few years.
Beyond such "rule of thumb" applications, the poten-
tial impact of attrition data and success rates is less clear.
One area that offers promise is the use of such data as a
quality factor in determining the optimal allocation of re-
cruiting efforts across regions. In particular, there is
merit, at least theoretically, in the inclusion of a quality
factor when comparing the recruit production of different
26

Recruiting Stations. The success rates of recruits from
these stations can be used as this quality factor.
References 11 and 16 both addressed the problem of
optimal allocation of the most obvious vehicle of recruiting
effort, the recruiters themselves. It is stated that, at
the optimal allocation of recruiters, the marginal product
of recruiters in each region will be equal (marginal product
being the increase in enlistments due to the addition of
one recruiter to the region) . This follows from economic
theory. However, strictly speaking, that theory does not
apply unless the product is homogeneous across regions:
the enlistees must be exactly the same in each region. It
is more correct, then, to include a quality factor for each
region when evaluating the marginal product of the recruiters
Indeed, there are measurement difficulties which
compound the problem. The use of an average success rate
for a region in computing a marginal product cannot be
rigorously justified because just as adding more recruiters
to a territory results in decreasing returns in terms of
enlistments per recruiter, it is reasonable to expect also
that as an area is more and more saturated with recruiters
there may be some difficulty in maintaining a specified




. 167, equating net productivity figures (the number
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of recruits per recruiter who complete training or complete
their enlistments) across regions still will not ensure
optimality because the cost of the failures must be consid-
ered an additional input.
As complicated as the allocation problem is, it
does not seem justifiable to ignore the quality factor
without first checking to see if there are any significant
differences across regions. Any such differences are likely
to have a large effect on a solution to the allocation prob-
lem because, when these marginal products were evaluated
without a quality factor in 41 Navy recruiting districts
/Ref. 117, the mean of all marginal products was only 2.20
and the range was also small (1.28 to 2.76), indicating
that the potential for increased quantitative efficiency
through reallocation of recruiter assets was quite small.
The use of quality factors based on previous attrition or
success rates of enlistees from the various regions would
surely put these marginal productivities in better per-
spective. These quality differentials, if they exist,
should also have similar implications for the allocation of
other forms of recruiting expenditures such as advertizing.
Finally, if success rates can be determined down to
a reasonably small region, then managers of the Recruiting
District will have some additional information at their
28

disposal with which to evaluate the historical production
of fairly specific localities. It is at least potentially-
feasible to determine attrition rates down to the county
level, provided a sufficient number of men have been en-
listed from the county. The time lags involved do not per-
mit the use of this type of information to evaluate the
performance of particular recruiting personnel, but such




IV. DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSIS
The objective of this research was to analyze personnel
data residing in magnetic tape files at Headquarters, Marine
Corps, in an attempt to shed further light on the character-
istics of that portion of the enlisted population that fails
to complete a full term of service for adverse reasons in-
dicative of poor personnel quality. Knowledge of these
characteristics might be useful in manpower planning and
policy determination as outlined in Chapter III above.
A. DATA
The data for this study was provided on a computer tape
by the Manpower Management Research and Measurement Section
at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) . The tape, con-
taining statistical records of Marines discharged from
service during Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976, was extracted
at HQMC from the files of the Transaction Retrieval System
(TRS) , a subsystem of the Marine Corps Manpower Management
System. The TRS is a historical file that records certain
transactions which are reported on the Unit Diary Report
by each Reporting Unit Command (normally the company level)
.
The Unit Diary includes reports of every official transaction
that affects any member of that command, such as promotion,
30

transfer, absence, and, of interest here, discharge. The
report of a discharge results in the building by the com-
puter facility of a 240 byte statistical record that
identifies in detail the Marine who was discharged. The
attrition tape here included such a record for every male
Marine who was discharged from his first enlistment during
Fiscal Year 1975 or 1976 for any reason.
From this group, those discharges which resulted from
circumstances indicative of substandard personnel quality
or undesirable conduct were singled out by means of a
separation code on the record. In order to maintain some
consistency with other studies and current Marine Corps
policy, the definition of this group of interest as used
here is the same as that used by the Manpower Planning Pro-
gramming and Budgeting Branch (MPP) at Headquarters, Marine
Corps. The actual codes are listed in Appendix A. The
types of discharges considered here include all punitive
discharges, as well as those administrative discharges re-
lated to character or behavior disorder, motivational
problems, enuresis, inaptitude, alcoholism, discreditable
incidents (civilian or military), shirking, drugs, financial
irresponsibility, unsanitary habits, civil court conviction,
security, fraudulent enlistment, homosexuality, sexual per-
version, good of the service (in lieu of Court Martial),
31

and other reasons indicating misconduct, unfitness, and
unsuitability.
The specific selection by MPP of those codes to be con-
sidered is based on judgment and is necessarily somewhat
arbitrary. Certain other causes such as hardship or the
Vietnam-related clemency program might have been included;
however, the difficulty of interpreting results, coupled
with the small number of observations or the temporary
nature of the problem, makes the desirability of the in-
clusion of these causes somewhat problematic. Of the
102,542 discharge records examined, 674 were deleted be-
cause they indicated the discharge occurred prior to FY 1975,
leaving 101,868 records of Marines discharged in FY 1975 or
1976. Of these, 37,287 were coded to indicate one of the
causes considered here to be adverse. It is this group
that is of primary interest because the problems they
generate are out of all proportion to their numbers.
The 240 bytes of each record contain a wealth of infor-
mation that identifies each Marine discharged. The data
fields used in this study were civilian education level,
mental group based on Armed Forces Qualification Test
percentile scores, age, race, and state and county home-
of-record. Some additional fields were also examined for
each record in order to determine whether or not the data
32

was as purported to be. The items checked were date released
from active duty, separation designation code, length of en-
listment, military occupational specialty at discharge, re-
porting unit command at entry and discharge, monitored
command code at discharge, program enlisted for, source of
entry and GCT. Although there were a few irregularities
in some of the distributions examined, there was no trend
in the errors so as to imply some bias due to incorrect
selection of records, and in no case did the number of
apparent erroneous entries approach 1% of the observation.
B . METHOD
The method of analysis used in this study was a function
of the objective of the study and the data available. In
pursuit of the objective, it was decided to select data that
would, to the maximum extent, portray the personnel attri-
tion picture of the Marine Corps as it currently exists.
Thus, it was deemed important to single out information on
very recent discharges, going back in time only in order
to provide greater numbers of records, or "observations,"
so as to give some credence to attrition rates and proba-
bilities determined. This differs from the approach used
in most previous studies that have used cohort data, studying
what happened over time to the members of a group that
33

entered during some selected period in the past. The time
lag between cohort entry and end of active duty allowed in
the studies varies from one to four years, and the dis-
charges occurred throughout that period, predominently during
the early portion. The result has been the description of
attrition patterns that were occurring up to 3 or 4 years
prior to the study date.
The choice in this study, then, was to look at the re-
cords of Marines who were recently (FY '75 and '76) dis-
charged for adverse reasons and compare them with the
records of all Marines discharged during the same period
to determine how this unsatisfactory group differs from
the population as a whole. The approach may be thought of
as a "cohort-in-reverse" where the cohort has the release
date in comman rather than the entry date. Just as many
members of a traditional cohort go on beyond many of their
contemporaries to serve a full four year term or reenlist
to serve more, the members of this discharge cohort entered
at a full range of times up to four years previous to dis-
charge date. The discharge population as a whole contains
first term discharges for all reasons including completion
of enlistment, discharges pursuant to reenlistment , medical
discharges, the adverse discharges of interest here, and
34

others. Thus there is no bias due to exclusion of a
particular quality group.
Once the adverse attritions were singled out from the
population as a whole, both the adverse group and the entire
population were subdivided according to race, education
level, mental group (based on Armed Forces Qualification
Test percentile score) , and age at enlistment, according
to the breakdown shown below:
1. Race Caucasian
Non -Caucasian
2. Education Level Less than H.S. Diploma
Graduate Equivalency Diploma (GED)
H.S. Diploma or higher
3. Mental Group Category 1 or II (score 65-100)
Category IIIA (score 51-64)
Category IIIB (score 31-50)




When these subdivisions were cross-tabulated, the re-
sult was 72 groupings or cells. These groupings allowed
the calculation of the probability of receiving an adverse
discharge for individuals who could be identified as being
a member of a particular cell.
The calculation of the numbers of records in each four-
subscript subdivision is both voluminous and time-consuming,
even with high speed computers. Most statistical packages
are not designed to handle such a large number of records
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and normally it is necessary to use sampling techniques to
estimate the probabilities. Such a sampling scheme, how-
ever, was likely to result in many cells with insufficient
observations to allow any confidence in the results. The
program finally adopted here is titled "XDIM," written by
Mr. Dick Wells of the Defense Manpower Data Center, formerly
known as the Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center
(MARDAC) , and was used with permission of that organization.
This program is ideally suited for this type of application,
tallying the number of records in each of the subdivisions
for both the adverse-discharge group and the overall-
discharge group.
The calculation of probabilities was very simply done
through use of the following formula:
A. . - ,
P (A>x,J,k,l N . J)k)1
where P(A) is the probability of adverse discharge, the
subscripts i,j,k,l refer to the four variables (race, edu-
cation level, mental group, and age), "A" is the number of
adverse discharges, and "N" is the total number of dis-
charges. The probability of success, of avoiding an adverse
discharge, is the complement:
P(S) = 1 - P(A)
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The probability of success is presented in Table II for each
subdivision of characteristics.
This same general method was used to investigate whether
there are quality differences (as manifested by probability
of success) across geographical boundaries, controlling for
education level (recognizing that quality of education and
that requirements for the GED vary from state to state) and
for mental group, another characteristic that has been re-
ported to be an important determinant in success in other
studies
.
Finally one further investigation was conducted based
on the hypothesis that previous studies have failed to de-
tect quality differences across geographic boundaries
because the level of aggregation was too high. The use of
regions such as East, West, etc., or Northwest, North
Central, and Southwest may aggregate very different quality
factors of smaller regions to the point where they cancel
each other out. The same may also be true of states. Sig-
nificant quality differences in existence at the county
level may be obscured when counties are aggregated to the
state level. The last portion of this study thus used the
methodology already outlined to examine quality differences
across counties within the state of California. California
was selected because of its diversity and its large contri-




The results of the program execution and probability
calculations described above are presented as the probability
of successfully completing enlistment in Tables II, through
VI. In this context, "success" is defined as the avoidance
of an adverse discharge and is determined for certain only
by the receipt of some more satisfactory discharge. Of
the 101,868 discharges examined, 37,287 were adverse, for
an overall success rate of 637o. Below is a discussion of
how this success measure appears from the tables to be
related to each of the variables considered in the analysis.
A. EFFECTS OF THE VARIABLES
1. Race
In general, Table II indicates that whites are more
likely to succeed in receiving a satisfactory discharge
than are other races, i.e., Negro, Malayan, Mongolian, and
American Indian. Differences among these non-white races
were not investigated. Although there is considerable
variation and, in some otherwise similar subdivisions, non-
whites are more likely to be successful than are whites,
this appears as the exception to the rule. The apparent




Probability of Successfully Completing
First Enlistment by Race, Education,
Mental Group, and Age *
RACE WHITE NON--WHITE
MG AGE <HS GED HS+ <HS GED HS+
17 .39 .68 .80 .33 .43 .61
I&II 18 5c 19 .45 .68 .84 .36 .49 .64
20+ .49 .58 .81 .37 .49 .60
17 .43 .73 .80 .31 .57 .60
IIIA 18 & 19 .45 .74 .82 .39 .56 .66
20+ .46 .63 .76 .40 .59 .64
17 .48 .69 .74 .40 .56 .79
IIIB 18 & 19 .48 .73 .79 .45 .71 .70
20+ .44 .65 .72 .45 .62 .71
17 .60 .78 .76 .56 .65 .75
IV 18 & 19 .66 .75 .79 .61 .75 .81
20+ .58 .80 .79 .61 .75 .76
* N for each subdivision is shown in Appendix C.
Definition of abbreviations and terms:
White - Caucasian
Non-White - other than Caucasian
MG - mental group
I&II - AFQT percentile scores 65-100
IIIA - AFQT percentile scores 51-64
IIIB - AFQT percentile scores 31-50
IV - AFQT percentile scores 0-30
<. HS - less than a High School diploma
GED - graduate equivalency diploma
HS+ - a High School diploma or more
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those in the higher mental groups and for high school gradu-
ates. For these groupings the difference in probability of
success is about 207o .
2. Education
Of all the variables examined, education level has
the most significant and most consistent effect on proba-
bility of success. In most comparable cells the chances
for successfully completing an enlistment for those with a
high school degree are from 20% to 40% better than for non-
graduates. The position of those with a Graduate Equivalency
Diploma is less consistent, but normally falls somewhere
between the non-graduates and the graduates. The marginal
probabilities of success, not shown in the table, are .46
for those with no degree, .69 for those with a G.E.D., and
.79 for the high school graduates. Education level will be
discussed further in connection with the results of the
state by state analysis.
3. Mental Group
When Table II is examined for the effect of the
mental group on success chances, an unexpected result appears,
In the discharges studied, those records indicating lower
mental groups are more likely to be satisfactory discharges
than are the higher mental groups, particularly noticeable
in the lowest mental ability grouping, category IV. The
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same pattern emerges in almost every age, race, and educa-
tional category. This result runs contrary both to intui-
tion and to the results of virtually every known previous
study in this area.
Further checking was conducted. Coding of variables
was the most obvious potential source of error and these
were checked to ensure their correctness. The mental groups
were then recoded based on GCT scores to see if some system-
atic bias was introduced by the deletion by the program of
a large percentage of discharge records due to omission or
erroneous entry of AFQT score. (AFQT score was read as
"unknown" by the program on almost TL of the records. The
percentage of "unknowns" was less than 17o for all other
variables.) The use of mental group based on GCT confirmed
the original finding.
Finally the distribution of this discharge cohort
with respect to mental group was compared with a like dis-
tribution of Marine Corps accession records from Fiscal
Years 1974, 1975, and 1976. It was discovered that mental
group IV Marines make up a much larger proportion of this
discharge cohort than they do of the accession group. This
evidence coupled with verbal confirmation from Headquarters
Marine Corps, that mental group IV Marines are no longer
being enlisted, and with evidence that the majority of
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adverse personnel attritions occur in the first two years of
service /Refs. 1, 1Q7 led to the following interpretation.
The validity of this model for determining proba-
bility of success is predicated on the assumption that
enlistment policies are fairly steady during the period
that the Marines in the study were enlisting, a full four-
year period prior to the first discharges (July 1974) . If
enlistment policies were fairly constant, a steady state
would be achieved by the distribution of a "discharge
cohort" would be the same as an entry cohort.
In this case the policy regarding the enlistment of
mental group IV individuals changed abruptly. The result
was that the mental group IV Marines in this group had
already completed the first portion of their enlistment,
and their chances of success had improved significantly.
Thus these results are biased in that they make category IV
personnel appear more successful than they really are.
4. Age
Comparison of subdivisions that are otherwise
similar indicates that the 18 and 19 year-old enlistees
have a slightly better chance of success than do either
17 year-old accessions or those who are 20 or older. Com-





Table III presents a state by state breakdown of
the probabilities of success for Marines discharged during
FY '75 or '76. These probabilities are further broken
down by education level and by mental group. In subdivisions
in which fewer than thirty Marines were discharged, the
probabilities are not reported because they are likely to
be misleading. Marginal probabilities across all mental
groups are presented for each education level in each state.
Z - scores are determined by comparing these marginal prob-
abilities within each state with the corresponding marginal
probabilities for the overall population. The normal approx-
imation is appropriate here, and Z is calculated for each







where P is the orobability of success across all states for
e - J
a certain education level, (.46 for non-graduates, .69 for
GED holders, and .79 for high school graduates), P G is the
probability of success in the state of interest for that
education level, and n is the number of discharges in our
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Since fifty states and the District of Columbia
were examined, considerable variation was expected due to
chance alone. In order to determine which, if any, state
deviations were of significance (better or worse than the
average) , the significance level was conservatively set at
5% (Z=+1.96). Still, 5% of the 51 states, or 3 states
were expected to fall in this critical region owing to
chance alone and no difference in personnel quality. Table
III indicates that many more than 3 states had Z scores
indicating they were significantly different from the
average of all states. Those states are listed on Table IV
along with their probability of success. Since about 3
states in each educational grouping were expected to fall
in this critical region by chance alone, one or two should
be deleted from each list, but unless the study were re-
peated there is no assurance that the right states would
be deleted. At any rate, most of the states listed in
Table IV exhibit strong variations from the overall average
for the education level indicated.
There are a considerable number of management in-
ferences that can be drawn from these tables. First of all,
people from different places are likely to be somewhat
different in their chances for success in the Marine Corps.




States Exhibiting Significantly Different
Success Probabilities-*-






Michigan .53 Ohio .37
Idaho .61 Pennsylvania .40
California .50 New York .41
Louisiana .52 Kentucky .36
Colorado .53 New Jersey .39
Illinois .49 West Virginia .39





Michigan .78 Minnesota .48
South Carolina .87 California .62
Massachusetts .83 Virginia .58
Connecticut .79 West Virginia .53
Indiana .75 Texas .65
New Mexico .80 New Jersey .58
Tennessee .77 Maine .51
Georgia .61
High School Graduates
Idaho .90 Ohio .73
Texas .83 New York .71
Washington .86 Georgia .71
Arizona .86 Pennsylvania .75
New Mexico .87 Alabama .73
Wisconsin .83 New Hampshire .66
Louisiana .83 Florida .75
Oregon .84 South Carolina .74







^-Listed in order of significance.
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diplomas from different states do not always indicate
similar probabilities of success. In fact a G a E.D. from
a number of states is an equally strong indicator of per-
sonnel quality as is a high school diploma from a large
number of others. Certainly this potential source of man-
power should be viewed accordingly. On the other hand
G.E.D. results from some other states indicate personnel




Table V lists the results obtained when the proba-
bility of success was calculated for each educational level
in each county in California. Here the results are less
informative than the state-by-state breakdown, mainly be-
cause the numbers of discharge records for many of the
counties were too small. Once again, probabilities were
not computed if the total number of discharges at a par-
ticular education level in a county was less than 30. The
G.E.D. is dropped from the tables because the requirements
for the G.E.D. are the same statewide. Counties for which
probability figures were not calculated were aggregated
based on geographic proximity and the probabilities for

























































^Probabilities are reported only if the number of discharges

















































Success Probabilities in Aggregations of Contiguous
California Counties Not Reported Individually
Counties Included
Modoc, Lassen, Shasta, Siskiyou,
Trinity, Del Norte, Humboldt
Plumas, Butte, Yuba, Sierra,
Nevada




Placer, El Dorado, Amador, Alpine,
Calaveras, Tuolomne, Mariposa
Stanislaus, Merced




Less Than HS Diploma














Z - scores were again computed for each subdivision.
Of all the counties and aggregations examined, only the
following results were significant at the .05 level:
County Education Level Z_ P(S)
Sacramento High School Graduates -5.23 .63
San Diego Non-graduates -3.63 .39
Los Angeles High School Graduates +3.30 .82
Kern High School Graduates +2.51 .91
It should be noted, however, that the probabilities vary-
throughout Tables V and VI in a fashion similar to the state-
by-state analysis. If these probabilities hold up, as they
might well do as the number of observations increases, they
would become significant. The power of the analysis is lost
by insufficient observations. Other than the above results,
which could lead to some useful management inquiries
(especially with respect to the surprising San Diego result)
,
the county analysis is not conclusive.
B. DISCUSSION
The effect of abrupt policy changes on the usefulness
of this analysis has already been discussed. Accordingly,
Table I is not sufficiently accurate for use as an "Odds
for Effectiveness" tool. The results are susceptible to
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the introduction of error by past manpower policy initia-
tives particularly where those policies are directed at
solving the problem currently under study. However, for
variables not affected by such major policy shifts, the
results should be accurate and a good indicator of what
might constitute or contribute to personnel quality. It
is believed that the variables other than mental group
have not been materially affected by policy changes. The
one possible exception to this is the accession policy
with respect to education level. The percentage of non-
high school graduates in enlisted accessions was decreased
from about 50% in FY '75 to about 33% in FY '76. The
effects this policy change would have on the data would be
to lower slightly the attrition rate for non-graduates,
thus raising their probability of success as determined
here. Since the success probabilities shown in the tables
for non-graduates are so much lower than the like figures
for graduates, the effect of any such bias, if present, is
inconsequential.
Certainly other possible sources of error are present
in the data itself. Numerous records were read as "unknown"
by the programs because of improperly entered data. It is
logical to assume that numerous other data entries were
easily read but were, in fact, incorrect. There is no
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reason to believe, however, that these data errors resulted
in systematic bias of the results.
Instructions for the coding of the G.E.D. in Manpower
Management System files are presented in Reference 17 but
are not entirely lucid, and it is not certain that the
G.E.D. entry is a condition that existed at the time of
enlistment rather than acquired during the enlistment.
This study adopted a strict interpretation of Reference 17,
regarding only a "Certificate of High School Equivalency"
as a G.E.D. G.E.D. 's shown on the file examined were
assumed to exist prior to entry into the service. If an
appreciable number of them were acquired during the enlist-
ment, the effect would most likely be to bias success prob-
abilities upwards for G.E.D. holders. The variance between
states, however, is not likely to be affected.
State and county entries on records have been reported
as subject to question. The entry is home of record and
this is sometimes interpreted differently at the working
level. It may refer to where the individual is living at
time of enlistment (as intended) or it may indicate the
enlistee's parents' address or "where he hails from." Any




In the state and county analysis, no attention to race
was explicitly made because of time constraints. It should
be remembered that since Table IE indicated some difference
between success probabilities based on race alone, varying
racial balances in the accessions from the various states
may be responsible for some of the differences reported
among the states. This factor is worthy of consideration.
We have discussed the significance of some of the re-
sults obtained. It seems appropriate to discuss significance
versus usefulness. The probabilities singled out in Table IV
as significant are classified as such because of a combina-
tion of their differences from the overall mean and the
number of discharges upon which the probability for this
subdivision was calculated. Thus a very small difference
may be significant if the number of discharges in a cell
was great enough. Such knowledge is likely to be less
useful by a manager, though, than a larger difference from
the mean based on a smaller number of discharges. In fact
the results of some cells may be useful to a manager even
though the number of observations is too small to be termed
significant at the 57o level. The reason for reporting the
Z - scores and significant states and counties is to show
that there are definite differences in personnel quality
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across geographical boundaries beyond the amount expected
due to chance alone.
The tables and results reported here are open to further
analysis, interpretation and criticism. Their usefulness
should be enhanced by a close relationship with the Marine






The results of most of the past efforts at examining
this personnel attrition problem are confirmed in general
terms. The major additional finding is that there are
definite differences in personnel quality as manifested by
receipt of a satisfactory discharge among the states,
especially when controlling for education level. In the
interest of personnel quality it is logical to consider
these differences when allocating recruiting assets and
determining recruiting goals by area. Thus if it is neces-
sary to accept an increased number of G„E.D. holders because
the available supply of high school graduates is insufficient,
it is much more sensible to take them from Massachusetts or
South Carolina than from Minnesota or Maine. By the same
token, non-graduates from Michigan and Idaho are preferable
to those from Ohio or Kentucky. The overall force improve-
ment may be marginal, but it is undoubtedly worth the effort.
Enlisted manpower quality and its impact on readiness have
been too long overlooked.
The quality factors for geographical areas are worthy
of consideration in the allocation of recruiting assets.
Geographical differences in propensity to enlist have been
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looked at time and again with only modest results. The
overall recruiting allocation problem will only be solved
when the propensity issue is combined with the quality issue
This study was not conclusive in determining what quality
differences exist at the local (county) level because of
insufficient data. But it is quite possible that they do
exist and the potential contribution to personnel effective-
ness makes the study worth substantial further effort.
The combination of recruiter productivity, in terms of
numbers of enlistees, and a measure of personnel quality
of the enlistees, both for each specific area, should be
the measure of effectiveness of both the recruiter and the
area, and this should be the decision rule for allocating
recruiting resources. Here, expected mean time of service
until discharge was not examined, but this may be a useful
way of translating the recruiter's (or the area's) effective-
ness into quantifiable terms. The result is a measure by
recruiter (or area) of man-years of service recruited per
dollar of recruiting effort. Implicit in the algorithm
should be some penalty cost for adverse personnel discharges
(failures)
.
An accurate and comprehensive estimate of such
cost, including opportunity costs and impact on unit morale
and effectiveness, as well as the accounting costs involved,
is an effort that can be made only with a judicious
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application of subjectivity. But some such attempt should
be made in order to protect the service from the effects of
the suboptimization that results if personnel quantity is
pursued at the expense of quality.
Current Marine Corps policy recognizes the quality
problem; it is the reason for the recent policies of in-
creasing the percentage of high school graduates and elimin-
ating mental group IV men in Marine Corps accessions.
However, the final solution to the overall cost-effectiveness
and resource allocation problem must include some notion of
geographical differences in quality as well as in propensity
to enlist. This study has used rough measures and has merely





Separation Program Designators Considered as Adverse
The following separation program designators (SPD's) are
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Number of Discharges in Each Subdivision
Reported on in Table II
RACE WHITE NO*f-WHITE
MG AGE <HS GED HS+ <HS GED HS+
17 3557 1227 1363 511 51 79
I&II
18 & 19 2741 1059 8528 625 70 585
20+ 948 379 3274 284 51 416
17 4256 1135 903 765 75 131
IIIA
18 & 19 3173 890 5187 942 121 857
20+ 852 299 1557 417 63 545
17 5835 1207 1094 1357 204 393
IIIB
18 & 19 6223 1110 6119 2679 290 2306
20+ 1729 328 1894 1104 152 1384
17 453 105 267 117 34 150
IV
18 & 19 2254 1237 1755 1199 120 1310
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